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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the explicit representation of demand-side resources as par-
ticipants in the day-ahead electricity markets and assesses their impacts on schedul-
ing and prices. These resources offer to reduce their loads and compete side-by-
side with the supply-side resources in the hourly auctions in the day-ahead mar-
kets for energy and capacity-based ancillary services. These demand-side market
participants are commonly referred to as demand response resources (DRRs).
The unit commitment problem is used as the vehicle for the study and to
evaluate the changes in the operating schedules of the supply-side resources and
the resulting prices. In the study, the load recovery effects that accompany the
load curtailment that DRRs provide are assessed. A mixed-integer programming
solver is used to explicitly represent the integral nature of the decision variables
involved in determining the optimal schedules for next day system operations. The
solutions of the unit commitment problem are studied to develop appropriate
insights into the impacts of DRRs on the prices and quantities of energy and
capacity-based ancillary services in the hourly auctions for the next day. The
testing is performed on a test system with 24 supply-side resources, to quantify
the role of the DRRs in the joint electricity markets for energy and capacity-based
ancillary services.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On entering a room and flipping the switch, one expects the lights to turn on
immediately. When millions of electricity consumers turn on/off various electric
appliances it causes a change in the demand for energy. The aggregation of
all the users creates a daily load pattern that varies widely between the peak
and off-peak hours. In an electric grid, the energy consumption and production
must balance at all times; any significant imbalance could cause grid instability
or severe voltage fluctuations, leading to blackouts in the system. Therefore,
sufficient resources are needed to meet the load in the system at any point in
time; balance between load and generation can be achieved either by increasing
the generation or by decreasing demand. Demand response in a broad sense is
used to refer to mechanisms used to encourage consumers to reduce their load,
thereby reducing the demand for electricity.
In the subsequent chapters of the thesis, the role of demand response in the
modern power system is explored. But before that, light needs to be shed on the
normal operations of the electric grid.
1.1 Background
As previously mentioned, sufficient generation is needed to meet the demand
throughout the day; as a result it is possible that during the off-peak hours, some
of the units might be operating at their minimum generating limit or might even
be turned off. But, deciding which of the available units to turn on or off is a dif-
ficult decision to make, and an incorrect choice may lead to sub-optimal usage of
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the available generation resources. Therefore, the problem confronting the power
system operator is to determine which of the available units should be running
or shut-down, during what time interval, and for how long. Unit Commitment
(UC) is the process of determining the optimal unit generation schedule over a
set time period subject to device and system operating constraints and opera-
tional policies and regulatory requirements. The UC objective is to minimize the
operating cost for meeting the electric power demand by scheduling the available
generators, while at the same time satisfying all the constraints on the system
and the components.
Security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) is the determination of the
schedules for the generating units, to minimize the operating costs while satisfy-
ing the prevailing constraints, including load balance, system spinning reserves,
ramp rate limits, fuel constraints, emission requirements and minimum up- and
down-time requirements. There are three key aspects involved in the SCUC de-
termination: ensuring that the load demand and the reserve requirements are
met, secure operation of the system, and accomplishing these at the least possible
cost to the operator. The load constraint is the prime driver to the entire process
and the system operator tries to guarantee that this is satisfied at all times. The
normal operation of the system is assured by providing sufficient reserves even
when problems arise in the system. Generally, the cost is minimized by commit-
ting less expensive units first (but this may not always be possible because of the
constraints involved) and then dispatching the committed units according to the
economic order of merit.
In the old utility environment, the system dispatcher for the utility had the
knowledge of the system components, constraints and operating costs of the gen-
erating units, and this information would be used to determine the UC schedule.
In the last decade, the industry has undergone restructuring such that the once
vertically integrated generation, transmission and distribution systems are now
unbundled to encourage competition. This shift has resulted in the formation of
competitive wholesale electricity markets managed by independent system opera-
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tors (ISOs). In many restructured systems, an ISO operates central energy mar-
kets and has the authority to determine a centralized unit commitment schedule
to commit and schedule generators participating in the market. ISOs also func-
tion as balancing authorities, balancing supply and load, implementing congestion
management, and providing reserves.
In the modern power systems, energy price need not be cost-based. Market
participants offer energy into the competitive pool for each trading interval. At
first glance, it may seem that the energy dispatch process in a price-based com-
petitive pool is very similar to the conventional, cost-based dispatch, with the
incremental costs of energy production being replaced by offer prices. However,
the difference is in the fact that offer prices can vary according to bidding strate-
gies that a supplier might follow and may be quite different from actual costs
which are much more predictable and manageable from a dispatcher’s point of
view.
1.2 Overview of the Day-Ahead Electricity Markets
Power system restructuring has made it possible to identify, unbundle, and thereby
open to competition various services that were normally carried out by a vertically
integrated utility; i.e., restructuring of the electric industry has turned generation
into a competitive activity taking place in a market-based environment. ISOs are
responsible for facilitating such a market and for ensuring that the demand is met
at all times. The markets can be classified, according to the time at which the
market decisions are taken, as year-ahead, day-ahead or real-time. The timeline
of these markets is given in Fig. 1.1. This thesis will focus on the day-ahead
markets; hence, there is a need to know more about the buyers, the sellers and
the market clearing methodologies of this market.
In the day-ahead market, the sellers submit sealed bids for the quantities
they wish to sell and the corresponding prices. The sellers consist of various
generation companies willing to generate power and demand-side participants
3
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Figure 1.1: Timeline for electricity markets
ready to decrease the load they consume. The buyers also submit sealed bids
indicating their willingness to buy electricity in the market. The buyers can make
use of either price-sensitive or fixed demand bids. This collection of offers and
bids in the market is used by the ISOs to determine the set of successful offers
and bids and the resultant market clearing price. The type of dispatch model in
which both the both energy and ancillary services are jointly cleared is known as
simultaneous co-optimized market clearing, as shown in Fig. 1.2. When multiple
products are involved, the merit-order or sequential dispatch methods may not
achieve good results. The challenge is in handling the interaction between the
various products that exist in the market and still yielding the most economical
and reliable UC schedule. The objective of simultaneous market clearing is to
minimize the net cost of meeting both energy demand and reserve requirements.
The problem formulation for this method, including the supply- and demand-side
energy and reserve offers and demand-side bids, is discussed in Chapter 3.
1.3 Overview of Ancillary Services
A common feature of the various designs of restructured electricity markets in
the US and around the world is the designation of a system operator that is re-
sponsible for the reliable real-time control of the transmission system that enables
operation of a competitive energy market. Energy is the primary commodity of
the market, but the ISO is also responsible for real-time load balancing, conges-
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Figure 1.2: Energy and capacity-based ancillary service market
tion management and provision of ancillary services. The precise definition of the
ancillary services varies across different restructured systems and so does the de-
sign of markets for competitive procurement and provision of such services. The
proper product definition and design of ancillary service markets can influence the
efficiency and performance of the markets and in turn influence system reliability.
Ancillary services have been defined, to a great extent, by the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC), respectively. In FERC’s Order 888, a document ordering sweeping
changes to the electricity industry vis-a-vis the unbundling of services, six ancillary
services were recognized. In this document, FERC ordered that these particular
services be included in an open access transmission tariff. Other services were
recognized to exist, but were not identified in this document [1]. The six core
ancillary services are so chosen because they are uniquely measurable and have
distinct impacts on system reliability criteria. Each service is also affiliated with
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one of the three corresponding reliability objectives, as listed below [2].
• Operating Reserves
– Regulation
– Spinning
– Supplemental
• Bulk Transmission Reliability
– Reactive power supply
– Frequency response
• Emergency Service
– Black-start capability
Under the operating reserves objective fall the regulation, spinning and sup-
plemental reserves services. As the name suggests, these services are responsible
for ensuring that there is always enough supply to meet the demand from one
instant to the next. The second reliability objective, bulk transmission, is respon-
sible for ensuring network (transmission system) security. Finally, under emer-
gency preparedness falls system black-start capability. This reliability objective
addresses the issue of restoring the bulk electric system in the event of a catas-
trophic failure. Regulation, spinning and supplemental reserve can be categorized
as capacity-based ancillary services and the rest of the thesis will focus only on
them.
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1.4 Capacity-Based Ancillary Service
Table 1.1: Reserve deployment periods
Reserves
Deployment Periods
Seconds Minutes Hours
Continuous
Regulation X
Contingency
Spinning X
Non-Spinning X
As specified in NERC’s operating policy, reserves must be:
sufficient to account for such factors as forecasting errors, generation
and transmission equipment unavailability, system equipment forced
outage rates, maintenance schedules, regulating requirements, and
load diversity [3].
There are multiple subcategories of operating reserve (Table. 1.1), which can
be ordered by their quality (where high quality corresponds to a short time to
deployment). These reserves, in descending order of quality, are frequency re-
sponse, regulation, spinning, non-spinning, and load-following reserves. Typically
a higher quality reserve can be used in place of a lower quality reserve, but at a
cost.
1.4.1 Regulation
Regulation response services, also known as automatic generation control (AGC)
allow the system operator to physically balance supply and demand on a real-time,
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instant-to-instant basis. Regulating reserves are provided by resources that can
adjust their output in response to a control signal generated by an AGC software
application that transmits real-time control signals with a very short period (2 to
6 s). This ensures that at all times the demand-supply equilibrium is maintained
as shown in Fig. 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Energy balance
1.4.2 Spinning reserve
Spinning reserve is the resource capacity synchronized to the system, which is able
to immediately begin supplying energy or reduce demand, is fully available within
10 min, and is able to be sustained for a period of at least 30 min to provide the
first level of contingency protection [4].
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1.4.3 Supplemental reserve
Supplemental reserve is a resource capacity not synchronized to the system, which
is able to supply energy or reduce demand, is fully available within 30 min, and
can be sustained for a period of at least 60 min to provide a second level of
contingency protection.
1.5 Market Clearing Strategies
The other challenge in operations and the dispatch of the generating units is how
to deal with competitive bidding of other products such as contingency reserves
and regulation capacity, part of the so-called ancillary services. As the electricity
industry moves toward full competition, the various services previously provided
by utilities are being unbundled. A lot of attention so far has focused on the
structures of markets for energy and transmission, but the design of markets for
ancillary services also requires serious attention and is getting more critical. Since
the same generators that are providing energy often have to provide these ancillary
services, the method of their selection and dispatch has serious implications for
ensuring the smooth working of the power system. Different methods for energy
and reserve dispatch also reflect the tradeoffs that govern market operation in
a real-world power system. Several alternatives for energy and reserve dispatch
are possible [5]: merit-order based dispatch, sequential dispatch, and joint or
simultaneously co-optimized dispatch.
Merit-order based dispatch: A multi-product market like that for energy
and capacity-based ancillary services can be regarded, in a very basic form as
a collection of markets having a separate merit-order stack for each product.
Each stack is generated based on the price and quantity of product offered by
each participant. The offer and bid blocks may be arranged in decreasing and
increasing order respectively to form the merit order for the system. The market
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is then dispatched by traversing this stack, climbing up (down), the stacked bids
(offers) until the load demand is met.
This approach is easy to understand and implement, but it may not lead to
the feasible or optimal solution when there is a coupling between the products
being sold. For example, a generator may be participating in both the energy and
the ancillary services markets, and if it gets accepted in both, its total output
capacity may fall short of the sum of energy and reserve to be dispatched.
Sequential dispatch: The sequential approach recognizes the deficiency of the
merit-order based approach and proceeds to overcome it by defining a priority-
based sequence of market commodities, progressively reducing the available ca-
pacity of each resource to meet system requirements for each commodity. The
manner in which the coupling between products is recognized can vary.
This approach is intuitive. However, its inability to determine the best trade-
offs in sharing limited resource capacity for energy and ancillary services may
result in higher prices or even insufficient supply for the lower priority commodi-
ties. As a result, the market has transitioned from sequential optimized clearing of
energy to a simultaneously co-optimized clearing of these products. On the other
hand, the simultaneous approach is based on formulating the dispatch problem in
the context of constrained optimization which provides improved coordination of
energy and ancillary service dispatch to achieve the most secure and economical
solution.
Further, with increasing energy costs, the manner in which the power system
is operated is also changing. The ability of certain loads to reduce their demand
in response to high electricity prices makes them an attractive option to employ-
ing expensive peak-load generators. Presently, efforts are being made by certain
ISOs to ensure that there is no strict distinction made between generators and
consumers (loads), i.e., the producers and consumers of electricity are treated im-
partially as players in the electricity market, participating with the intention of
maximizing their profits. Therefore, the need for increased generation at times of
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high demand can be treated symmetrically as the need for decrease in demand.
The demand-side resources that participate in the market curtail their load for a
specified period of time and they receive a payment in return, the magnitude of
which depends on the demand reduced and the prevailing market prices. There-
fore, high electricity prices can serve to encourage active demand side participation
in the market.
1.6 Demand-Side Management
Demand-side management (DSM) programs consist of the planning, implement-
ing, and monitoring activities of electric utilities, ISOs or RTOs that are designed
to encourage consumers to modify their level and pattern of electricity usage.
According to NERC, the various DSM programs commonly used fall under the
categories of conservation, load management, demand response, distributed gen-
eration, and energy efficiency [6], as illustrated in Fig. 1.4.
Distributed generation refers to the usage of small generators, typically 10 MW
or less, sited at or near the load, and attached to the distribution grid. Distributed
generation can serve as a primary or backup energy source.
Energy efficiency refers to programs that are aimed at reducing the energy used
by specific end-use devices and systems, typically without affecting the services
provided. These programs reduce overall electricity consumption, often without
explicit consideration for the timing of program-induced savings. Such savings
are generally achieved by substituting technically more advanced equipment to
produce the same level of end-use services (e.g. lighting, heating, motor drive),
but using less electricity.
Demand response programs offer customers incentives to reduce energy de-
mand during electricity supply emergencies, and opportunities to do so when
prices are high in the wholesale electricity markets. These programs are exam-
ined in detail in the next section.
Load management refers to strategic reduction of electric energy demand dur-
11
Figure 1.4: Demand-side management techniques
ing a utility’s peak generating periods. Load management differs from energy
conservation in that its strategies are designed to either reduce demand or shift it
from peak to off-peak times, while conservation strategies may primarily reduce
usage over the entire 24-hour period.
1.7 Demand Response
At the most general level, demand response is the ability of electricity demand to
respond to variations in price or other market conditions.
1.7.1 Definition
The U.S. Department of Energy in its February 2006 report to the Congress
defined “demand response” (DR) as: Changes in electric usage by end-use cus-
tomers from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price
of electricity over time, or to incentive payments designed to induce lower elec-
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Figure 1.5: Demand-side categorization
tricity use at times of high wholesale market prices or when system reliability is
jeopardized [7].
The electricity rates that the end-use customers see are based on the average
electricity costs and bear little relation to the time-varying price of electricity.
DR is a tariff or program designed to bring about changes in electricity use by
end-use customers in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to
incentivize lower electricity use at times of high market prices or low grid reliabil-
ity. The driving force behind using DR programs is the fact that lower electricity
use in peak periods creates benefits in the short run by reducing the amount of
generation and transmission assets required to provide electric service. Figure 1.5
provides a graphic illustration of the DR categories that provide demand-side
support to the system.
1.7.2 Passive demand response
Passive DR places the burden of action totally on the consumer, with no com-
munication or interaction from the supply side other than a variation in price.
Consumers are free to react to the fluctuations in price or not. Price-responsive
demand and even fixed demand (absence of any responsiveness on part of the
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load) can be considered as forms of passive DR. This can be adopted through
different schemes like dividing the tariff into three or four parts, or time-of-use
rates. But the only true manifestation of this approach is real-time pricing.
Real-time pricing programs are logical for large consumers because interval
metering usually already exists, and the cost of collecting and processing interval
meter data is small compared to the electric bill. These facilities also would have
personnel or automated equipment that could manage the facility and react to
high prices by actively modifying usage patterns; they might even have stand-by
generation that can be used to reduce load during an extreme peak. The savings
gained during thousands of low-priced hours makes the risk of high-priced periods
acceptable. Also, consumers would need to save enough during off-peak tiers to
pay for installation of required interval metering and for equipment necessary to
automatically react to higher prices.
1.7.3 Active demand response
Active DR typically involves the use of some form of communication between the
system operator and the customer, and the final control is exerted by the system
operator. In a more abstract manner, active DR resources can be considered as
a set of loads with a switch controlled by the system operator or load owner.
Depending on the type of program the customers are participating in, the final
decision about curtailing might be out of their hands and in those of the system
operator. An active DR program participant makes an offer to curtail his load,
or supply “ negative watt ”(NegaWatt), whenever a supply shortfall occurs. This
allows the system operator (ISO/RTO) to balance the supply and the demand
in the market. All demand reduction programs are ultimately price responsive;
therefore, the distinction of active DR is its use of programs that feature direct
communication between the system operator and the demand side.
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Interruptible demand
Interruptible demand programs are curtailment options integrated into retail tar-
iffs that provide a rate discount or bill credit for agreeing to reduce load during
system contingencies. The magnitude and the means of customer demand cur-
tailment depend on the contractual arrangements. This can be voluntary, or in
some instances the demand reduction may be effected by action of the system
operator (remote tripping or direct load control) after notice to the customer in
accordance with contractual provisions.
The class of devices or end users that are under direct remote control of the
system operator are often referred to as direct load control devices. The system
operator achieves load curtailment by interrupting power supply to individual
appliances or equipment on customer premises. The most familiar active control
systems are radio-controlled air conditioner cycling programs offered by many
traditional utilities. Modern programs allow control through wireless or Internet-
based control signals.
Demand-side bidding
Demand-side bidding involves demand-side resources that bid into a wholesale
electricity market offering load reductions, or agrees to curtail load when the
price increases above a specified threshold price. If the curtailment bid is not
accepted, then the resource behaves like a passive DR resource and may choose to
reduce its load in response to a high price; in this case, the demand-side picture
looks like Fig. 1.6. In this thesis, demand bidding programs are considered the
only method through which the demand side can participate in the market, and
such participants will be referred to from here on as demand response resources
(DRRs).
15
Figure 1.6: Demand-side categorization when demand-bid not accepted
The different services that can be provided by active DR are illustrated in
Fig. 1.7. Demand bidding provides a service to the energy market by freeing up
some capacity when it curtails its load. Since the opportunity to curtail demand
in times of high prices or system emergency can decrease the need for the amount
of generation to be kept on reserve, active DR also provides a service to the
capacity-based ancillary service market.
Figure 1.7: Services provided by active DR
Following is a real-life case study of a DR provider [8]. Associated Wholesale
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Grocers (AWG) in Nashville serves as a hub for grocery storage and distribution to
its more than 300 co-op members. The AWG facility is enormous, including more
than 500,000 square feet of dry storage and 250,000 square feet of refrigerated
storage. As a result, AWG is a major energy consumer, using more than 1 million
kWh per month resulting in a $ 1.4 million annual energy bill in 2007. AWGs local
electric utility, Nashville Electric Service (NES), made demand response available
to AWG. Established by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and offered by
NES, AWG enrolled in the TVA-EnerNOC Demand Response program. AWG
curtailed more than 850 kW by reducing its lighting and raising the temperature
set points by approximately 3 ◦F in its cold storage areas during DR events lasting
from 2 to 8 hours. These measures resulted in annual payments of more than
$ 25,000 for AWG.
Thus DR not only benefits the entire grid, but it also enables the DR providers
to generate revenue for decreasing their load.
1.8 Objective of the Thesis
In order to understand the impact of integration of DR into the resource mix, a
framework to reflect the effect of the usage of DRRs on the total demand, and use
it in the unit commitment problem formulation, is proposed in the thesis. The
solution of such a problem formulation would provide valuable insights into the
merits and de-merits of including DRRs in electricity markets and thereby help in
maximizing the benefits of a joint energy and reserves electricity market. Using
the formulation, a real-life UC problem is solved and various sensitivity studies
are conducted to fully explore the role of DR.
1.9 Literature Review
In this section, we explore the existing literature related to the solution of the
UC problem, and also the role of DR in UC. The origins of the UC problem lie
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in the hydrothermal coordination problem, i.e., how to split the generation in a
mixed hydro and steam generating pool of units during a 24-hour period, so as to
match the load at all times and also so that the daily volume constraints on the
hydro units and the capacity limits and other constraints are respected for all the
units. This is a very different problem from that of unrelated successive economic
dispatches that was used before to cope with load fluctuation, and the fact that
some of the constraints spanned different time slices of the period increased the
complexity of the problem.
This led to the recognition of the UC problem as one having a large economic
impact on the operation of the power system and a lot of research flowed into the
field. In the following paragraphs the different methods that have been used to
solve this problem [9]–[10] will be looked into to lay a foundation for the thesis.
In the exhaustive enumeration method, the UC problem is solved by enumer-
ating all possible combinations of the generating units and then the combination
that yields the least cost of operation is chosen as the optimal solution. In [11],
the UC problem is solved for the Florida Power Corporation by using this method,
but the method is not suitable for large systems.
The priority list method arranges the units based on the operational cost
characteristics. This predetermined order is then used for UC, so that the system
load is met at all times. Reference [12] applies priority listing for a system with
import/export constraints. Also, [13] solves the multi-area UC problem using a
priority ordering. The ranking process used for preparing the priority list is based
on specific guidelines of the utility, lending flexibility to this method.
Dynamic programming (DP) is one of the earliest methods used to solve the
UC problem [14]–[15]. DP searches the solution space that consists of the unit
status for an optimal solution. The search can proceed in a forward or backward
direction. Typically each hour of operation represents a stage in the DP. Forward
DP finds the most economical schedule by starting at the initial stage, accumu-
lating costs, then backtracking from the combination of least accumulated cost
starting at the last stage and ending at the initial stage [16]. DP builds and evalu-
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ates the complete decision tree to optimize the problem at hand. Thus, DP suffers
from the “ curse of dimensionality ” because the problem grows rapidly with the
number of generating units to be committed. But for a long period DP continued
to be the best method for solving the UC problem.
The landscape of UC solutions underwent a change after Muckstadt and
Koenig [17] published a paper introducing a technique called Lagrangian relax-
ation (LR) borrowed from the scheduling problem literature in the operations
research community and applied it to solve the UC problem. In this approach, a
Lagrangian dual function is formed by combining the constraints with the objec-
tive function using Lagrangian multipliers. The dual problem is then maximized
to get to the solution. The coupling constraints of the primal problem are relaxed
in the dual problem, which can then be separated into smaller subproblems. Dur-
ing optimization of the dual function, the solution of each subproblem provides
a commitment schedule for the corresponding generating unit. But the optimal
value found by this method can only be used as a lower bound of the optimal
problem [18]–[19]. The LR method is beneficial for utilities with a large number
of units since the degree of sub-optimality goes to zero as the number of units
increases. Further, it can be easily modified to add new constraints and include
unique characteristics of specific utilities.
A new approach for solving the UC problem based on the branch-and-bound
method was proposed by Lauer et al. [20] and Cohen and Yoshimura [21]. The
branch-and-bound procedure consists of the repeated application of these steps.
First, the portion of solution space in which the optimal solution is known to lie
is partitioned into subsets. Second, if all the elements in a subset violate the con-
straints of the problem, then that subset is eliminated. Third, an upper bound on
the minimum value of the objective function is computed. Next, the lower bounds
are computed on the value of the objective function when the decision variables
are constrained to lie in each subset still under consideration. A subset is then
eliminated if its lower bound exceeds the upper bound of the minimization prob-
lem. Finally, convergence takes place when only one subset of decision variables
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remain, and the upper and lower bounds are equal for that subset.
The mixed-integer programming (MIP) approach solves the UC problem by
reducing the solution search space by rejecting the infeasible subsets [22]–[23].
This is based on the extension and modification of the branch-and-bound method.
The UC problem is partitioned into a nonlinear economic dispatch problem and
a pure integer nonlinear UC problem based on Benders’ approach.
In several established electricity markets, energy and reserve are often traded
and scheduled in separate markets [24]. These markets have reserves cleared in
sequential order with only the generators submitting offers, and the system oper-
ator allocates the required amount after the energy market has been cleared. For
the purpose of avoiding the market inefficiencies that might be created by this
type of sequential model, a number of papers have researched the joint schedul-
ing of generation and reserve [4], [25]. The existing work for the most part has
emphasized the supply side only. But, as shown by the results in [26], consumers
also possess the capability to participate in the market. The framework for the
inclusion of demand-side participants is discussed in [27], and a modified version
of this model is used as part of the thesis. The work in [28] deals with a similar
problem, but the model adopted and the solution approach differ from those in
this thesis.
1.10 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis contains four additional chapters. A brief review of the structure of
the day-ahead ancillary service and energy market is given in Chapter 2. The
market participants are also introduced and the characteristics of the market are
discussed in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, a mathematical framework to formulate the UC problem and
extend it for inclusion of DRRs is described. The nature of the problem is dis-
cussed and the solution developed. The software tool used is introduced and the
modifications made on the UC problem formulation to ensure its proper solution
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are addressed.
In Chapter 4, the test case is presented and the numerical results are discussed.
Chapter 5 summarizes the thesis and gives recommendations for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
DEMAND RESPONSE RESOURCES AND
THEIR MODELING
This chapter explores the nature of demand response resources (DRRs) and their
role in meeting the total demand in the system. The modeling of DRRs in the
competitive electricity market environment is also discussed. The focus is on the
contributions of DRRs to the day-ahead markets for the electricity commodity
(MWh) and the capacity reserves service. The developed model is used in the
unit commitment schedule determination in the next chapter.
2.1 Demand Response Resources
The demand-side bidding programs that participate in the day-ahead electricity
markets are the DRRs. DRRs that offer a specified load reduction, with a specified
duration and price in the day-ahead markets (DAMs), are to be considered. The
DRRs are paid the market clearing price for curtailing their load, when required
by the ISO.
DRRs are load resources that actively participate in the DAMs by express-
ing their willingness to reduce their electricity consumption, at a specified offer
price. If the DRR offer price is below the market clearing price, the DRR offer
is accepted for that subperiod. In DAMs, the market clearing price is set by the
most expensive generating unit that is used to meet the demand in that subperiod.
Without DRRs the subperiod market clearing price is set solely by the supply-side
resources. At times of high demand the need for high-priced generating resources
may lead to electricity price spikes. With the participation of the DRRs, their
load reduction may avert the need for one or more of the high-priced generating
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resources and thereby lead to lower market clearing prices.
2.2 Impact of DRRs on Electricity Markets
The impacts of DRRs on the day-ahead transmission unconstrained markets for
energy and capacity reserves service are explored in this section. The independent
system operator (ISO) runs the day-ahead electricity markets for meeting the
needs for 24 hours of the next day. Typically, there are 24 hourly electricity
markets run by the ISO for the next day. The ISO collects all the offers and
bids from the generators and the loads, respectively, for all the subperiods of the
period under consideration, referred to as the scheduling horizon, and uses them
to determine the market clearing prices and the market clearing quantity for each
subperiod. For a subperiod market, the ISO constructs the supply curve from the
offers of the sellers and the demand curve from the bids of the buyers.
The focus of the discussion is on the day-ahead market corresponding to the
subperiod t of one hour duration. Each generating unit k submits its offer in
terms of its price-quantity pair information {σ k, t(·), p k, t}. The ISO has the total
demand forecast Dt to be met for the subperiod t. The DRR m is considered
to participate in such a market. The offer of the DRR for load curtailment is
submitted in terms of the price-quantity pair {ϑm, t(·), dm, t}.
The ISO constructs the supply curve from the offers of the generators and
determines the clearing price for the fixed demand Dt MW. The situation without
any DRR participation is considered first.
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Figure 2.1: Market clearing price determination in a subperiod market with fixed
demand
The concept can be illustrated with a supply and demand curve, shown in
Fig. 2.1. An illustrative supply curve is shown as a solid line; the demand curve
is idealized as a vertical dotted line, representing the fact that most customers
are not directly exposed to changes in the electricity prices, so their short-term
demand is unresponsive to price fluctuation. The ISO establishes the market
clearing price ρ t $/MWh for the fixed demand. Such a situation is illustrated in
Fig. 2.1 with the market clearing price given at the point of intersection of the
supply curve and the fixed demand line.
The total payments to supply the fixed load of D t MW is the product of D t
and ρ t. In Fig. 2.1, the payment amount is indicated by the area under the supply
curve.
Next, consider the case with the participation of the DRRs. The DRRm offers
to provide a load curtailment d MW at a price ξ. In other words, its offer is the
pair (d, ξ). If ξ < ρ t, the DRR m offer is accepted, since it costs less to reduce
a MW of load than to provide electricity to supply the load. Therefore, the ISO
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uses the supply curve to meet a demand of (D t − d) or D ′t MW and establishes
a new clearing price ρ
′
t. The accepted DRR m offer shifts the demand curve to
the left. This situation is shown in Fig. 2.2. Note that the new clearing price ρ
′
t
is not the actual price paid by the loads, since the payment to the DRR for its
curtailment efforts also needs to be taken into account.
Figure 2.2: Market clearing price determination with demand reduction
The price savings to non-curtailed load is given by the area gbed. Area gbed
represents savings to customers, but it also represents a reduction in revenue
generated by the suppliers relative to the less efficient situation in which demand is
unresponsive to market signals. The savings for the curtailed load are represented
by the area agfc.
The load cut of the DRR receives payment that compensates the DRR for
the service. Typically, the DRR is paid the market clearing price and, in effect,
the DRR receives payment for the energy savings its curtailment produces. The
payment to DRR m is therefore ρ
′
t ∗ d $ and is allocated to all the loads on a
simple pro rata basis. Thus, each MW of demand pays an additional
ρ
′
t ∗ d
D
′
t
$ and
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so the price for the buyers is ρˆ t $/MWh, where
ρˆ t = ρ
′
t +
ρ
′
t ∗ d
D
′
t
(2.1)
Next, consider the case with both fixed and price sensitive load and extend
the simplified situation for fixed demand that was discussed earlier.
Figure 2.3: Supply and demand curves
The ISO collects the offers from the generators and the bids from the loads.
Now, instead of all the demand being fixed, a price-sensitive component is also
introduced. The ISO establishes the market clearing price ρ t $/MWh. But not all
the demand is cleared; only the load willing to pay more than the market clearing
price will be served by the generators. Such a situation is illustrated in Fig. 2.3.
The total payments to supply the load of D t MW is the product of D t and
ρ t. In Fig. 2.3, the payment amount is indicated by the shaded area under the
supply curve.
Next, similar to the case with only fixed demand, a case with the participation
of the DRRs is considered. The DRR m offers to provide a load curtailment d
MW at a price ξ. If ξ < ρ t, the DRR m offer is accepted. Now, just sufficient
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supply to meet a demand of D
′
t is needed. But, depending on the supply curve,
the market clearing price may decrease or stay the same. The new clearing price
ρ
′
t as shown in Fig. 2.4 is the same as ρ
′
t.
Figure 2.4: Impact of DRRs
Similar to the earlier case of only fixed demand, the payment to DRR m, ρ
′
t ∗d
$ is allocated to all the loads in proportion to their demand and the increased
price to be paid by each MW of demand is indicated by Eq. (2.1).
In some of the existing markets, energy and capacity-based ancillary services
can be supplied by generators and DRRS through a process of competitive bid-
ding. The fact that the same resource and the same capacity may be used to
provide different products at the same time, implies that the capacity-based an-
cillary service market operation needs to be closely coordinated with the energy
market. As previously mentioned in the introduction, this close coordination is
best achieved through joint simultaneous optimization of capacity-based ancillary
service and energy markets.
In the joint optimization approach, the objective is to minimize the total cost of
providing capacity-based ancillary service along with energy offers to meet forecast
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demands as well as capacity-based ancillary service requirements. The allocation
of limited generation capacity among energy and capacity-based ancillary service
for a supply-side resource is determined in terms of its total cost of providing each
of the electricity market products relative to other competing resources.
The deployment of DRRs is a mechanism for harnessing the load reduction
capabilities of a few of the market participants. The ISO can opt to use such
resources whenever it is more economical than deploying supply-side resources.
The DRRs may offer load curtailment in direct competition with the offers of
supply-side resources for capacity reserves. Such offers are accepted by the ISO
as long as the costs of the associated reduction in reserves are below the costs of
using the supply-side resources. Using DRRs to provide capacity-based ancillary
service can free up some of the generating capacity that would have been locked for
fulfilling this need. In addition, the use of DRRs has an impact on the competitive
acquisition of reserves. The amount of reserves required by the system is a function
of the total system demand, and the reduction in the load resulting from the DRR
deployment reduces the reserves requirements.
Thus, upon the inclusion of DRRs in the capacity-based ancillary service mar-
ket, the capacity-based ancillary service provided by some of the expensive gen-
erating units can be replaced by the cheaper DRRs.
2.3 The Modeling of DRRs in the Day-Ahead Electricity
Markets
One hour is defined as the smallest indecomposable unit of time. The DRR model
makes use of the following notation:
• the total fixed demand D ft to be met in subperiod t;
• the total requested amount of capacity-based ancillary service R t in the
subperiod t;
• the power output p k, t of the unit k in subperiod t;
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• the capacity offered a k, t by unit k for the capacity-based ancillary service
in subperiod t;
• the load curtailment contribution dm, t of DRR m in subperiod t;
• the capacity offered αm, t by DRR m for the capacity-based ancillary service
in subperiod t.
The total fixed demand D ft in the subperiod t is met using the N generating
units and M DRRs in the system as shown in Eq. (2.2).
N∑
k=1
{p k, t · u k, t} = D ft −
M∑
m=1
{ dm, t · vm, t}
∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
(2.2)
where u k, t ∈ {0, 1} and vm, t ∈ {0, 1} are the unit commitment status flags for
generating unit k and DRR m respectively. In case the DRR m offer to curtail
load does not get accepted, i.e., vm, t = 0}, then in this thesis, the assumption is
that the demand remains unchanged. Therefore, the DRR m continues to draw
its share of the load from the system.
The total requested amount of capacity-based ancillary service is supplied as
shown in Eq. (2.3).
N∑
k=1
{a k, t · u k, t} +
M∑
m=1
{αm, t · vm, t} ≥ R ′t (2.3)
∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
where R
′
t < R t is the modified demand for capacity-based ancillary service in
subperiod t. It is less than R t, since the total load has decreased due the use of
DRRs, thereby leading to a lower need for capacity-based ancillary service.
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2.4 DRR Payback Effect Modeling
While a DRR whose offer gets accepted provides a load cut for the subperiod,
the energy that is reduced may be paid back in subsequent subperiods. All such
deferred energy usage is assumed to occur within 24 subperiods of the curtail-
ment. The deferred energy usage or load recovery is referred to as the payback
effect. As a result, the total demand increases during one or more non-curtailment
periods. The total payback may be less than, equal to, or greater than the energy
associated with the load curtailment. Therefore, the DRRs may alter the demand
in subperiods other than those in which they reduce demand. The effect on the
demand in a system with four DRRs is illustrated in Fig. 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Effect of DRRs on the load curve
In the day-ahead scheduling of resources by the ISO, the payback effect must
be explicitly considered in correctly representing the changed load profile resulting
from the load recovery entailed by the load reduction. In turn, the change in the
system load will cause changes in the market clearing prices. It is not known
whether the DRR offers will be accepted and hence the amount of load recovery
is also not known, since it is entirely a function of the amount of load reduction.
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This thesis assumes that, with the offer of each DRR, the information on the
payback effect is made available to the ISO. The DRR specific fraction of the load
cut in a subperiod h is recovered in the 23 hours that follow the curtailment. A
variable Φ hm, t is introduced to denote the fraction of the load cut in a 24-hour
period for the DRR m submitting a load curtailment offer in subperiod h. Thus,
the variable Φ hm, t captures completely the load reduction and repayment effect of
the DRR m.
Therefore, the net demand to be supplied by the generators is no longer an
exogenous parameter, but rather an endogenous variable which is unknown and
whose value needs to be determined. A matrix Φ h to model the load curtailment is
introduced in subperiod h and its associated repayment. The number of columns
in the matrix Φ h is fixed at 24, and the number of rows equals the number of
participating DRRs.
The matrix Φ h is constructed for every subperiod h in the scheduling horizon
using all the M DRRs. The structure of the matrix is depicted in Fig. 2.6. The
entry corresponding to the m th row (DRR) and the t th column (subperiod) of Φ h
is denoted by φ hm, t . The matrix contains three different categories of elements.
In Fig. 2.6, the shaded areas correspond to the load curtailment periods, the
cross-hatched areas correspond to the load recovery period and the periods not
corresponding to either are in white. All the values in the matrix are in proportion
with the load curtailed by the DRR in the subperiod h. A zero entry in Φ h implies
that DRR m has no impact in subperiod t. The entry φ hm, t when the DRR m
provides load curtailment in subperiod h is −1, and there are positive valued
entries φ hm, t for subperiod t, t > h when payback occurs.
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Figure 2.6: Structure of matrix Φ h for load curtailment in the subperiod h and
corresponding repayment in subsequent periods
The use of Φ h allows us to model different load repayment patterns. The
matrix Φ h is developed for each subperiod h, where one or more DRRs provide
load curtailment, and in this manner it is possible to capture the load curtailment
and payback effects throughout the scheduling horizon.
Therefore, the subperiod h load curtailment and repayment proportion in sub-
period t, t = h, h+ 1, . . . , h+ 23 for DRR m, φhm, t is given by:
φhm, t =

− 1 if t = h
γ t ≥ 0 if h < t ≤ h+ 23
0 otherwise
(2.4)
In order to include the payback load in the DRR model in Eq. (2.2) and
Eq. (2.3), the change in the system load because of the load repayment in the
subperiod t due to the load reductions (dm,h) in the previous subperiod h needs
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to be taken into account. Let NT be the set of all generating units committed
during the subperiod t, M t be the set of all DRRs committed during subperiod
t and Mh the set of DRRs whose payback load appears in subperiod h. The
modified DRR model including payback effect is given by:
N t∑
k=1
{p k, t} = D ft −
M t∑
m=1
{ dm, t}
+
t−1∑
h=1
Mh∑
m=1
{φhm, t · dm,h}
∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
(2.5)
In the capacity-based ancillary services market, the generating units and DRRs
whose offers are accepted provide the required amount of the capacity-based ancil-
lary service. The DRR accepted to provide capacity-based ancillary service may
or may not be called into action in real time. Therefore, it cannot be know in
advance at what time load repayment occurs.
N t∑
k=1
{a k, t} +
M t∑
m=1
{αm, t} ≥ R ′t (2.6)
∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
Hence in the thesis, the load repayment that might occur on providing the capacity-
based ancillary service is not taken into consideration.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has discussed the nature of DRRs and their role in the day-ahead
markets. The impacts of the DRRs on the market clearing price for a specific
subperiod have been studied, so as to explore the interactions between the supply
and the demand sides when DRRs participate in the markets. The concept of
payback effect was discussed and a model to explicitly account for load recovery
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and the modeling of the payback effects was developed. Key modeling elements
for DRRs were also provided. These modeling elements will be used in the UC
problem formulation in the next chapter. The model developed allows for a more
realistic examination of the effects of inclusion of DRRs in the electricity mar-
kets. Modeling elements discussed in this chapter constitute one of the major
contributions of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
THE UNIT COMMITMENT PROBLEM
The unit commitment (UC) problem in a power system involves determining the
start-up and shut-down schedule of units to be used to meet the forecast demand
over a specified short-term period, with a typical duration of 24–168 h. The so-
lution of the UC problem involves two interrelated decisions [17]. One is the
determination of the start-up and shut-down of each generating unit, so as to
specify the units that are operating during each subperiod of the specified period.
This determination takes into account the requirements for system capacity in-
cluding reserves, the economics and physical constraints on each unit and various
system, operational and regulatory/policy considerations and constraints. The
second is the economic dispatch decision and is a byproduct of the UC solution.
The dispatch decision involves the allocation of the system demand and spinning
reserves capacity among the units during each subperiod of operation. The two
interrelated decisions are determined by the UC problem solution of an optimiza-
tion problem whose objective is to determine the overall least-cost solution for
operating the power system over the scheduling horizon.
This chapter describes an extended UC problem formulation so as to explicitly
take into account the deployment of the DRRs. The nature of the extended prob-
lem formulation and the characteristics associated with its solution are analyzed.
At the start of the discussion is a brief review of the electricity markets, so as to
appropriately represent the UC problem in the competitive environment.
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3.1 Review of the Electricity Market
A fundamental element of a well functioning electricity market is the ability to
maintain the security and reliability of a physical power system while simulta-
neously providing correct economic signals to enable competitive market activi-
ties. The simultaneously co-optimized energy and capacity-based ancillary ser-
vices market introduced in Chapter 1 and used throughout this chapter is one
way of meeting these requirements.
ISO
system 
operator
market 
operator
network model
and constraints
load
forecast
bid data
unit dispatch
points
market
prices
Figure 3.1: Day-ahead market framework from ISO’s perspective
One hour is defined as the smallest, indecomposable unit of time. The day-
ahead market can be considered a collection of 24 separate electricity markets,
one for each hour of the next day. Based on historical data and meteorological
predictions, the system operator draws up a demand forecast for each hour of
the scheduling period. The system operator also accepts bids and offers from the
sellers and buyers, respectively, for each hour of the day-ahead market. As seen
in Fig. 3.1, the system operator uses the bids, offers, and demand forecast to
formulate the UC problem of determining the commitment and dispatch schedule
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with the offered units to meet the specified demand and reserve at least cost.
The solution arrived at by the system operator provides the market clearing price
and the market clearing quantity for each product at each hour of the scheduling
period.
The market will simultaneously clear and price energy, regulation, spinning
reserve, and supplemental reserve for the day-ahead scheduling period. Though
the day-ahead market consists of 24 hours, it needs to take into account units
which might have total required start-up, shut-down and running durations ex-
ceeding 24 hours. Therefore, to get a better solution, the UC problem is solved
for durations greater than 24 hours and then the extra hours are discarded. In
the capacity-based ancillary services market, substitution of a higher value service
like regulation for a lower value service like spinning reserve is allowed. Hence, for
the remainder of the thesis spinning reserves are considered the only participating
capacity-based ancillary service product in the market. Further, the market par-
ticipants (i.e., the sellers and buyers) may not always be connected to an actual
physical resource or load asset, but only sellers and buyers possessing physical
generation resources or load assets are considered in the thesis.
3.2 Review of the UC Problem Formulation
UC problem is an optimization problem that yields the schedule of units to min-
imize the operating costs of the power system, while taking into account various
factors like the minimum unit down time and run time, unit maximum and mini-
mum generation limits, etc. The problem is further complicated by the fact that
it is necessary to know not only when the unit has to operate, but also the gen-
eration level at which it has to operate. As the time for which scheduling is done
increases, the number of possible solutions also increases rapidly. Thus, the pres-
ence of multiple decisions to be made for the numerous units implies that the UC
problem has to be carefully cast into a proper mathematical framework, so that
the optimal schedule in a computationally efficient manner can be obtained. In
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the following section, the mathematical framework to represent the UC problem
is developed.
As previously stated, the goal of the UC problem is to minimize the total
operation cost over the scheduling period T , or minimize the the sum of the
production cost, the start-up cost and the shut-down cost over all subperiods t of
the scheduling period. In this thesis, the assumption is that the shut-down costs
are to be included in the start-up cost of each unit.
Start-up costs occur if unit k is shut down in subperiod t− 1 and is operating
in subperiod t. If u k, t is the status of generating unit k in subperiod t,
u k, t =
 1 if the unit is in operation0 if the unit is shut down
Thus start-up cost is incurred if u k, t−1 = 0 and u k, t = 1. At the end of
subperiod t, let the downtime of unit k be given by
τ−k, t = (τ
−
k, t−1 + 1) · (1− uk, t) ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (3.1)
and the corresponding uptime by
τ+k, t = (τ
+
k, t−1 + 1) · uk, t ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (3.2)
Let b sk(·) be the unit k start-up price function, with the start-up time status
indicator as the argument; then the start-up cost incurred by unit k is given by
start-up cost = b sk(τ
−
k,t−1) · (1− uk, t−1) · uk, t (3.3)
Production cost for a subperiod t consists of the cost incurred when unit
k supplies amount p k, t of power in the energy market or contributes a k, t in the
capacity-based ancillary service market. Let σ k, t(·) be the energy offer function of
the generating unit k for the subperiod t, with the argument p k, t, and let ξ k, t(·)
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be the generating unit k capacity-based ancillary service offer function in the
subperiod t, with the argument a k, t, the megawatt amount offered, ξ k, t(·) ≥ 0.
Then, the total production cost of unit k for the subperiod t is given by
production cost = {σ k, t(p k, t) + ξ k, t(a k, t) } · u k, t (3.4)
The system operator needs to minimize the operating costs over all the N
individual units for the entire scheduling period T , so that the objective function
of the UC problem is to determine
min
u,p,a

N∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
b sk(τ
−
k,t−1) · (1− uk, t−1) · uk, t
+
N∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
{σ k, t(p k, t) + ξ k, t(a k, t) } · u k, t
 (3.5)
When a generating unit is on, its generation and ancillary services are con-
strained by its operational characteristics. For unit k, let pmink be its minimum
capacity, pmaxk be its maximum capacity, a
max
k be the maximum capacity-based
ancillary service capability, and τ dk, τ
u
k be the minimum down- and uptimes, re-
spectively. In the thesis, the ramping rates of the units are not included in the
definition of the up- and downtimes. The following operating constraints have to
be met:
p k, t ≥ 0
pmink ≤ p k, t ≤ pmaxk
0 ≤ a k, t ≤ amaxk
pmink ≤ p k, t + a k, t ≤ pmaxk

∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
∀ k = 1, 2, . . . , N
(3.6)
Further, once started, the duration for which the unit is operating has to be more
than the minimum uptime, and once shut down, the unit cannot be restarted until
the end of the minimum downtime duration:
τ k, t ≥ τ dk , τ k, t ≥ τ uk ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T, k = 1, 2, . . . , N (3.7)
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For all the subperiods t, all the units have to supply the demand for energy
(D ft ) and capacity-based ancillary service (R t) in the system, as given by:
N∑
k=1
{p k, t · u k, t} = D ft ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (3.8)
N∑
k=1
{a k, t · u k, t} ≥ R t ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (3.9)
Thus collecting all the previous equations,
min
u,p,a

N∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
b sk(τ
−
k,t−1) · (1− uk, t−1) · uk, t
+
N∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
{σ k, t(p k, t) + ξ k, t(a k, t) } · u k, t
 (3.10)
subject to
N∑
k=1
{p k, t · u k, t} = D ft ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (3.11)
N∑
k=1
{a k, t · u k, t} ≥ R t ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (3.12)
p k, t ≥ 0 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (3.13)
pmink ≤ p k, t ≤ pmaxk
0 ≤ a k, t ≤ amaxk
pmink ≤ p k, t + a k, t ≤ pmaxk

∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
∀ k = 1, 2, . . . , N
(3.14)
τ k, t ≥ τ dk , τ k, t ≥ τ uk ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T, k = 1, 2, . . . , N (3.15)
The formulation in Eqs. (3.10)-(3.15) is referred to as the UC problem. The capac-
ity limits of the individual units are handled through Eq. (3.14). Equation (3.15)
handles the minimum up/downtime constraint. Given the status indicator for
the total unit uptime until the previous hour (τ+k, t−1), it is possible to calculate
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Eq. (3.15) by
τ k,t = ( τ
+
k,t−1 + 1 ) · u k,t (3.16)
and check for
τ k, t ≥ τ uk, t (3.17)
Similarly, the minimum downtime constraint is calculated as follows. Given the
status indicator for the total unit downtime until the previous hour (τ−k, t−1), cal-
culate Eq. (3.15) by
τ k,t = ( τ
−
k,t−1 + 1 ) · (1− u k,t) (3.18)
and check for
τ k, t ≥ τ dk, t (3.19)
Thus, the equations presented in this section represent the mathematical formu-
lation of the UC problem.
3.3 Extended Problem Formulation
The inclusion of DRRs to the resource mix means that there is an option other
than the generators to meet the demand. But as explained in Chapter 2, the use
of DRRs may result in payback load, making the determination of the optimum
schedule even more difficult. The UC problem formulation of Eqs. (3.10)-(3.15)
is extended to include the payback effects of the DRRs [29]. The DRR model
presented in Eqs. (2.3) and (2.5) is used to handle the extended problem in the
familiar structure of the UC problem [30].
In addition to the notation defined in Chapter 2, let us define a few more
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notations. Let M be the number of DRRs in the system and m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}
be the index for DRRs. Further, let dm, t be the load curtailment contribution
of DRR m in subperiod t and αm, t be the capacity contribution of DRR m for
capacity-based ancillary service in subperiod t.
The problem facing the system operator is to find the optimal system schedule
considering all the available generation units and DRRs, in order to minimize the
total cost of providing both energy and capacity-based ancillary service for the
entire scheduling period.
In order to obtain the extended UC problem formulation from the basic UC
formulation, DRRs need to be included in the objective function and in the con-
straints. The cost incurred by the system operator when DRR m reduces its de-
mand by dm, t in subperiod t is given by [ϑm, t(dm, t) · vm, t ], and when it provides
αm, t of capacity-based ancillary service, the cost incurred by the system operator
is [χm, t(αm, t) · vm, t ]. The power balance constraint and the capacity-based an-
cillary service constraint in Eqs. (3.11) and (3.12), respectively, are replaced by
Eqs. (2.3) and (2.5), so as to include DRRs and their payback effect.
min
u,v,p,d,a, α

N∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
b sk(τ
−
k,t−1) · (1− uk, t−1) · uk, t
+
N∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
{σ k, t(p k, t) + ξ k, t(a k, t) } · u k, t
+
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
{ϑm, t(dm, t) · vm, t}
+
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
{χm, t(αm, t) · vm, t}

(3.20)
subject to
N∑
k=1
{p k, t · u k, t} = D ft −
M∑
m=1
{ dm, t · vm, t}
+
M∑
m=1
t−1∑
h=1
{φhm, t · dm,h · vm,h}
∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
(3.21)
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N∑
k=1
{a k, t · u k, t} +
M∑
m=1
{αm, t · vm, t} ≥ R ′t (3.22)
∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
p k, t , dm, t ≥ 0
pmink ≤ p k, t ≤ pmaxk
0 ≤ a k, t ≤ amaxk
pmink ≤ p k, t + a k, t ≤ pmaxk

∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T
∀ k = 1, 2, . . . , N
(3.23)
0 ≤ αm, t ≤ αmaxm
dminm ≤ dm, t + αm, t ≤ dmaxm
 ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T∀m = 1, 2, . . . , M (3.24)
τ k, t ≥ τ dk , τ k, t ≥ τ uk ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T, k = 1, 2, . . . , N (3.25)
The problem listed in Eqs. (3.20)-(3.25) is referred to as the generalized UC (GUC)
problem and it takes into account the contribution of DRRs and the effect of
payback load on the scheduling of the units.
3.4 Mixed-Integer Linear Program Approach
The GUC problem formulated in the previous section has a nonlinear objective
function and nonlinear and inter-temporal constraints. Further, the participation
of DRRs and the fact that the occurrence of payback load cannot be predicted
complicate matters. Therefore, there is a need to restate the GUC problem in such
a manner that the solution process is simplified. For this purpose, this section
describes the details of the conversion of the nonlinear functions into a linear form,
so that they are suitable for solution by a MILP solver.
Many advanced commercial packages are available to solve the MILP problem.
In this thesis, the GUC problem described in Eqs. (3.20)-(3.25) is solved using
the MILP solution technique, making use of the optimization software CPLEX.
CPLEX is a sophisticated and computationally efficient tool that can handle even
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large-scale MILP problems. Tomlab, a general purpose development environment
in MATLAB, was used to code the problem into a format solvable by CPLEX.
Tomlab, the product of the Tomlab optimization company, is a general pur-
pose development environment in MATLAB for solving optimization problems.
The Tomlab/CPLEX package can be used to find the decision variable x =
[x 1, x 2 . . . , x i] using CPLEX through the Tomlab environment, given that the
problem can be arranged in the following form:
min
x
f(x) =
1
2
xF x
′
+ c
′
x
subject to
xL ≤ x ≤ xU
bL ≤ Ax ≤ bU
x is an integer
(3.26)
where c, x,xL, xU ∈ Rn and F ∈ RnXn, A ∈ RmXn and bL, bU ∈ Rm.
The cplexTL solver present in this package is capable of solving LP, MILP, and
mixed-integer quadratic programming (MIQP) problems and is used in this thesis
to solve the GUC problem. The cplexTL solver solves problems in the form of
Eq. (3.26) [31].
Substituting F = 0 in the objective function of Eq. (3.26) gives us the general
form of a MILP problem:
min
x
f(x) = c
′
x
subject to
xL ≤ x ≤ xU
bL ≤ Ax ≤ bU
x is an integer
(3.27)
The structure of the GUC problem can be manipulated to fit Eq. (3.27). The
objective function would have to be expressed in the matrix multiplication form,
44
in which case the vector c would contain the start-up, energy and ancillary service
offers of the participating resources. All the GUC constraints would have to be
expressed in the form bL ≤ Ax ≤ bU , where bL and bU are the lower and
upper limits, respectively. Note that in Eq. (3.27) the decision variables can only
be summed up, not multiplied. The prohibition on multiplication of decision
variables also makes it necessary to separately calculate the start-up flag for unit
k at time t s k, t using the unit commitment variables for the present and the prior
hour. The start-up flag is defined to take on values 1 or 0 only, and it is calculated
using:
s k, t = u k, t − u k, t−1
sm, t = vm, t − vm, t−1
(3.28)
Next, the following T and N dimensional vectors are defined:
D = [D1, D2, . . . , DT ]
′
, R = [R1, R2, . . . , RT ]
′
,
uk = [u k, 1, u k, 2, . . . , u k, T ]
′
, pk = [p k, 1, p k, 2, . . . , p k, T ]
′
,
ak = [a k, 1, a k, 2, . . . , a k, T ]
′
, vm = [vm, 1, vm, 2, . . . , vm,T ]
′
,
αm = [αm, 1, αm, 2, . . . , αm,T ]
′
, dm = [dm, 1, dm, 2, . . . , dm,T ]
′
,
ξ = [ξ 1, ξ 2, . . . , ξN ]
′
, ϑ = [ϑ 1, ϑ 2, . . . , ϑN ]
′
,
χ = [χ 1, χ 2, . . . , χN ]
′
, b s = [b s1, b
s
2, . . . , b
s
N ]
′
,
σ = [σ 1, σ 2, . . . , σN ]
′
,
and the NT and MT -dimensional vectors:
u = [uT1, u
T
2, . . . , u
T
N ]
′
, p = [pT1, p
T
2, . . . , p
T
N ]
′
,
v = [vT1 , v
T
2 , . . . , v
T
M ]
′
, a = [aT1, a
T
2, . . . , a
T
N ]
′
,
s = [sT1, s
T
2, . . . , s
T
N ]
′
, d = dT1, d
T
2, . . . , d
T
M ]
′
,
α = [αT1 , α
T
2 , . . . , α
T
M ]
′
Using the previous definitions, Eq. (3.20) is rewritten to obtain the general
form of the objective function of the GUC problem:
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min
u,v,p,d,a, α
[
b s σ ξ ϑ χ
]

s
u
v
p
d
a
α

(3.29)
For a generating unit k for period t, Eq. (3.29) expands into
min
u,p,a
[
b s1 ∗ s k, t + 1 ∗ u k, t + σ k, t ∗ p tk + ξ k, t ∗ a k, t
]
(3.30)
For a DRR m for period t, Eq. (3.29) expands into
min
v,d,α
[
b s1 ∗ sm, t + 1 ∗ vm, t + ϑm, t ∗ d tm + χm, t ∗ αm, t
]
(3.31)
The solution to the GUC problem can be obtained by minimizing Eqs. (3.30)-
(3.31) over the entire time period for all the units and DRRs subject to all the
unit and time constraints respectively.
In Eqs. (3.20)-(3.23), most of the constraint functions can be easily trans-
formed to correspond to the structure in Eq. (3.27); exceptions are the total de-
mand constraint and the capacity-based ancillary service constraint. Both these
equations contain two decision variables—the unit commitment status and the
generation/curtailment level of the units—multiplied by each other.
A general representation is as follows:
f(h, δ) = h δ
such that
δ ∈ {0, 1}
hL ≤ h ≤ hU
(3.32)
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where h, δ are the decision variables, δ is a {0, 1} integer variable, and h is a
continuous variable.
When a function of two variables is linear with respect to each variable, it
is known as a bilinear function. The bilinear function in Eq. (3.32) needs to be
linearized to make it suitable for solving with MILP. A bilinear function can be
transformed into a linear function by adding several extra constraints as indicated
in the following steps:
• Replace h δ by introducing a continuous variable y, obtaining the logical
conditions
Let y = h δ
so that
δ = 0→ y = 0
δ = 1→ y = h
(3.33)
• This gives the following extra constraints:
y − Lδ ≤ 0
−h+ y ≤ 0
h− y +Mδ ≤ L
(3.34)
where L is an upper bound for h (and hence also for y) [32].
For illustration purposes, the UC problem with only the generation resources
is considered. As mentioned in Eq. (3.33), y k, t is introduced to replace each
(p k, t · u k, t) term, leading to a new set of constraints. Equation (3.35) gives the
set of equations needed to be substituted in Eq. (3.11).
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N∑
k=1
y k, t = D
f
t
y k, t − pmaxk · u k, t ≤ 0
− p k, t + y k, t ≤ 0
p k, t − y k, t + pmaxk · u k, t ≤ pmaxk
(3.35)
The capacity-based ancillary service constraint represented in Eq. (3.12) is
also subject to a linear transformation. The term z k, t is introduced to replace
each (a k, t · u k, t) term in Eq. (3.12). This leads to a new set of constraints:
N∑
k=1
z k, t = R
f
t
z k, t − amaxk · u k, t ≤ 0
− a k, t + z k, t ≤ 0
a k, t − z k, t + amaxk · u k, t ≤ pmaxk
(3.36)
These new constraints are inserted in the left-hand sides of Eqs. (3.21) and
(3.22), and then, along with the right-hand sides, are converted into the required
format. The bilinear functions involving the DRR terms are similarly converted
into linear functions. Once there are only linear functions present in the GUC
problem, it is possible to utilize the MILP solver to find the solution to the problem
using CPLEX.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, the UC formulation was presented and then modified to allow for
the inclusion of DRRs into the problem formulation. The problem formulation
was discussed, and the objective function and the associated constraints were
explored. In addition, the solution methodology was also discussed. The material
presented in this chapter provides a background to interpret the results presented
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in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The discussion in the previous chapters provides a conceptual understanding of
how DRRs can be included in the process of scheduling the units for the day-ahead
market and also the important role of DRRs in setting aside the usage of more
expensive units. The focus of this chapter is on simulating the impact of DRRs
and their associated payback load on the scheduling of generating units, market
clearing prices and the total scheduling cost. An extensive set of simulations is
carried out to study the impact of the usage of DRRs on the system operation.
4.1 Test System
The test system used in the simulations is a 22 generating unit system owned and
operated by the New Brunswick Power Corporation (NB Power) [33]. The data
for the 22 units is provided in Appendix B. Units 1 and 9 are coal units, 2 to 6
are oil units, 7 and 8 are orimulsion units, 12 to 16 and 10 are combustion units,
11 is a nuclear unit and 17 to 22 are hydro units. The test case is supplemented
by the addition of DRRs.
The hourly load data is a scaled down version of the MISO load curve for the
week starting July 31, 2006, and ending August 5, 2006. In the simulation study
conducted, ramping constraints are ignored, startup costs are time independent,
and transmission constraints are ignored. Attention is focussed on the energy
market in order to get a better understanding of the consequences of DRR usage.
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4.2 Simulation Results
4.2.1 Reference case
First, consider the UC solution in the absence of DRRs. The load curve and
the market clearing prices at each hour are shown in Fig. 4.1. As expected, the
maximum market clearing price of 126.97 $/MWh is reached for the hour with
the maximum load cleared (3795 MW) during hour 16.
Figure 4.1: Reference case - load curve and market clearing price
4.2.2 Reference case with single DRR
A single DRR is added to the resource mix of the reference case with the limitation
that the DRR can participate only for an hour in a 24 h period of time. The
addition of the DRR has an immediate impact on the market clearing prices.
As shown in Fig. 4.2, the market clearing price during hour 16 drops to 112.02
$/MWh from 126.97 $/MWh in the reference case. The price also drops in the
peak periods corresponding to the next four 24 h periods, due to the DRR being
committed.
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Figure 4.2: Single DRR - load curve and market clearing price
The impact of increased DRR curtailment capacity on the system is also of
interest. The sensitivity of the system to increased DRR curtailment capacity is
tested by measuring the change in the total cost for supplying the forecast load.
The UC problem tries to minimize the scheduling cost, which is defined as the
total cost including start-up, no-load, and the variable operating costs over the
entire scheduling period. Therefore, the variation of the scheduling cost with the
capacity of the DRR provides a good measure of the efficacy of DRR usage.
Figure 4.3 shows that the scheduling cost decreases as the amount of load
reduced by the DRR increases. The curtailment by DRRs substituting the gen-
eration by more expensive generating units is the cause of the decrease in the
scheduling cost.
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Figure 4.3: Scheduling cost vs. DRR curtailment capacity
4.2.3 Reference case with single DRR and payback load
Next, consider the payback load associated with the single DRR used. For this
case, the DRR is assumed to increase its demand by an amount equivalent to its
load curtailment (i.e., 100% payback load), 12 h after the curtailment occurs. The
impact of the payback load on the market clearing prices is observed in Fig. 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Single DRR with payback effect – load curve and market clearing
price
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The introduction of the payback load has an immediate effect on the market
clearing prices. Of the 5 days for which scheduling takes place, the DRR does not
get committed on days 3 to 5, whereas it gets committed on all the five days in the
absence of payback load. It is worth noticing that the DRR remains uncommitted,
even though its curtailment offer is lower than that of competing generators. The
fact that DRRs are not used is because, when the additional cost of the payback
load and its influence on the market clearing price at the hour in which payback
occurs are taken into consideration, the DRR is no longer the most economically
viable alternative.
Another fact that can be highlighted is the influence of the payback load on
the DRR offer. Consider a fixed level of load curtailed and a fixed hour at which
the payback load appears. A sensitivity study can be conducted by increasing the
payback load to ascertain its influence on the DRR offers.
Figure 4.5: Cleared DRR offer vs. payback load
From Fig. 4.5, it is apparent that the highest DRR offer that gets accepted
decreases as the payback load increases. On considering the payback load, the
hidden costs attached with the usage of DRRs are more clearly represented. This
gives a more complete picture of the true cost related to using DRRs, namely, the
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increase in the market clearing price at a later hour because the total demand
increased at that hour, due to the payback load. As the payback load increases,
the DRR risks pricing itself out of the market if it prices its load curtailment too
high.
4.2.4 Multiple DRRs
The effect of increased number of DRRs competing in the market on the market
clearing prices is also investigated. For this purpose five more DRRs are intro-
duced, so that the test system now consists of 22 generating units and 6 DRRs.
It is assumed that each DRR participates for only an hour in each 24 h period.
Further, out of the participating DRRs, there are two that are competing to cur-
tail load during the same hour. This is to highlight the fact that the DRRs may
compete not only with the generators, but also with each other.
Consider the scenario in which all the DRRs, including the two competing in
the same hour, get scheduled in the day-ahead market. This results in the DRRs
diminishing the market clearing price during times of high demand. This case is
illustrated in Fig. 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Competing DRRs where both get cleared
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The use of two DRRs in hour 16 leads to a drop in the market clearing price
from 126.97 $/MWh to 67.16 $/MWh.
Next, examine the case in which only one of the two DRRs competing in the
same hour gets cleared. The other DRR prices itself out of the market. As seen
in Fig. 4.7, the prices during the hours in which the DRRs compete are still lower
than the reference case, but higher than those charted in Fig. 4.6.
Figure 4.7: Competing DRRs where only one gets cleared
Further let us evaluate the behavior of the market clearing price, with varying
system peak load and how it is influenced by the usage of DRRs. The price
duration curve (PDC) is constructed by ignoring time and rearranging the loads
in decreasing order from the highest to the lowest.
Figure 4.8 depicts the PDC for varying loads in the absence of DRRs. The
peak loads are represented as a percentage of the total generation capacity in the
system. The maximum market clearing price varies from 67.16 $/MWh to 210
$/MWh as the peak load increases. The system operator is forced to schedule
more expensive generators as the total demand to be met increases; this fact
explains the different levels of the price curves.
Next, the market clearing price in the presence of DRRs is examined at differ-
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Figure 4.8: Price duration curve for different load levels, in the absence of DRRs
ent load levels.
Figure 4.9: Price duration curve for different load levels, in the presence of DRRs
Figure 4.9 illustrates the PDC in the presence of DRRs. The use of DRRs
decreases the highest market clearing prices at all the load levels. Further, the
total number of hours for which the market clearing price is above 120 $/MWh
decreases from 22 h in the absence of DRRs to 3 h in their presence for the highest
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load curve. The other peak load levels also witness a reduction in market clearing
prices, but not to this extent. Thus, the highest impact of the use of DRRs is at
times of high system demand.
The impact of DRRs on generators is examined by plotting the unit commit-
ment status variable for units 13–16. These units sell their output on the market
in the price range from 93.59 $/MWh to 151.56 $/MWh. Figure 4.10 plots the
unit commitment status variable in the absence of DRRs.
Figure 4.10: UC status variable in the absence DRRs
Figure 4.11 plots the status variable in the presence of DRRs. Observe that
the usage of the generators has decreased in the presence of DRRs, since DRRs
provide a less expensive option to the system operator compared to the generating
units.
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Figure 4.11: UC status variable in the presence DRRs
4.3 Concluding Remarks
The results of the simulation studies on the test system were presented in this
chapter. Using different scenarios, the role of the DRRs in the day-ahead energy
market was explored. The use of DRRs benefits the system by bringing about
a decrease in the total scheduling cost. The relation between the DRR and its
associated payback load and its influence on the DRR offer was also brought into
focus. It was found that the magnitude of payback load and the period of its
occurrence can hinder the use of DRRs by the system operator.
Multiple DRRs were introduced to address competition between DRRs. The
nature of the impact of multiple DRRs on the market clearing price was evaluated.
The use of multiple DRRs is a very effective strategy to combat high prices in the
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electricity market. The influence of varying load levels on the use of DRRs and
its impact on the market clearing prices were also examined.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, the UC problem formulation is extended to better incorporate
DRRs. The system operator accepts bids from generators to sell and offers from
DRRs to curtail, then determines a minimum cost schedule of the available units
to meet the energy and capacity-based ancillary services demand.
The key feature of the work in this thesis is the development of a model to
explicitly include DRRs, their demand curtailment and the associated payback
effect. The model is then used to extend the UC formulation. The advantage
of the model developed is that it has the flexibility to allow the effective capture
of different kinds of load curtailment and payback scenarios. The extended UC
problem is solved using a MILP based solver.
The numerical results provide some insight into the operation of DRRs in a
competitive market. One salient feature of the numerical work is the impact of
the use of DRRs on the market clearing prices. The presence of DRRs leads to
a lowering of the market clearing prices, and the decrease is more pronounced on
days with higher levels of system demand. A strong incentive exists for the ISOs
to encourage more DRR participation in their markets. The presence of a number
of competing DRRs makes it possible to lower energy consumption across peak
demand periods, thereby decreasing the price spikes.
However, introduction of the payback effect leads to an increase in the effective
cost of using DRRs, and leads to a decrease in the number of successful DRR
offers. Some work has been done pertaining to the magnitude and time of the
payback load, but detailed study of the payback effect is beyond the scope of this
presentation. Such work is left for future research. Since payback load can appear
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over periods of low system load, the integration of DRRs and an intermittent
energy source like wind energy is another interesting topic for future work.
Developments in the United States have indicated that the use of DRRs is
gaining favor among the system operators and the end-users. The measures to be
undertaken to encourage DRRs and ensure fair treatment for all the participating
resources constitute a difficult challenge for the electric industry. But what is
clear is that the electricity market will be required to adjust to the phenomena of
active demand-side participation, posing new problems for engineers and offering
new avenues for future research.
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APPENDIX
The unit characteristics of the generators used in the numerical analysis and their
initial states are specified in Table A.1.
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a
unit
maximumpoweroutput
minimumpoweroutput
start-upcost
minimumuptime
minimumdowntime
initialon(+)/off(-)
initialstatus
pricesegment1($/MWh)
segment1minimumpoweroutput
segment1maximumpoweroutput
pricesegment2($/MWh)
segment2minimumpoweroutput
segment2maximumpoweroutput
pricesegment3($/MWh)
segment3minimumpoweroutput
segment3maximumpoweroutput
1
48
0
17
5
22
90
4
6
10
1
1
4
.6
7
1
7
5
2
8
0
1
7
.2
6
0
1
5
0
1
9
.8
5
0
5
0
2
13
2
15
74
.2
6
6
10
1
5
5
.0
1
2
5
6
4
.7
2
0
6
7
4
.4
3
0
2
3
12
2
30
31
0
6
6
10
1
4
8
.0
7
3
0
6
2
5
6
.5
5
0
3
0
6
5
.0
3
0
3
0
4
37
0
80
87
0
2
6
10
1
4
9
.6
4
8
0
1
5
0
5
8
.1
0
1
5
0
6
6
.8
4
0
7
0
5
37
0
80
87
0
2
6
10
1
4
9
.4
8
0
1
5
0
5
8
.4
0
1
5
0
6
7
.1
6
0
7
0
6
37
0
80
87
0
2
6
10
1
4
9
.0
6
8
0
1
5
0
5
7
.7
2
0
1
5
0
6
6
.3
8
0
7
0
7
12
3
35
51
0
6
6
10
1
2
5
.2
6
3
5
6
3
2
9
.7
2
0
3
0
3
4
.1
8
0
3
0
8
21
5
85
13
20
6
6
10
1
2
5
.5
3
8
5
1
3
5
3
0
.0
3
0
6
0
3
4
.5
3
0
2
0
9
61
15
42
0
6
6
10
1
2
3
.1
7
1
5
3
1
2
7
.2
6
0
2
5
3
1
.3
5
0
5
1
0
29
3
40
0
1
-1
0
0
7
5
.3
4
3
1
1
8
8
.6
3
0
1
5
1
0
1
.9
2
0
3
1
1
68
0
10
0
64
0
4
4
10
1
2
.1
4
1
0
0
2
9
0
2
.5
2
0
3
0
0
2
.9
0
9
0
1
2
11
0
20
15
0
2
1
-1
0
0
8
2
.0
2
2
0
5
0
1
3
0
.7
9
0
4
0
1
5
0
.5
6
0
2
0
1
3
11
0
20
15
0
1
1
-1
0
0
1
1
2
.0
2
2
0
5
0
1
3
1
.7
9
0
4
0
1
5
1
.5
6
0
2
0
1
4
11
0
50
15
0
1
1
-1
0
0
9
3
.5
9
5
0
7
0
1
1
0
.2
8
0
2
0
1
2
6
.9
7
0
2
0
1
5
11
0
50
15
0
1
1
-1
0
0
9
4
.5
9
5
0
7
0
1
1
1
.2
8
0
2
0
1
2
7
.9
7
0
2
0
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maximumpoweroutput
minimumpoweroutput
start-upcost
minimumuptime
minimumdowntime
initialon(+)/off(-)
initialstatus
pricesegment1($/MWh)
segment1minimumpoweroutput
segment1maximumpoweroutput
pricesegment2($/MWh)
segment2minimumpoweroutput
segment2maximumpoweroutput
pricesegment3($/MWh)
segment3minimumpoweroutput
segment3maximumpoweroutput
1
6
11
0
20
15
0
1
1
-1
0
0
1
1
1
.8
3
2
0
5
0
1
3
1
.5
7
0
4
0
1
5
1
.3
1
0
2
0
1
7
50
2
20
0
0
0
10
1
1
0
2
0
7
5
5
8
.2
6
0
3
7
7
2
0
0
0
5
0
1
8
12
3
20
0
0
0
10
1
1
0
2
0
3
0
5
9
.2
6
0
5
8
2
1
0
0
3
5
1
9
64
12
0
0
0
10
1
1
0
1
2
2
0
6
0
.2
6
0
2
4
2
2
0
0
2
0
2
0
20
5
0
0
0
10
1
1
0
5
1
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6
1
.2
6
0
5
2
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0
0
5
2
1
19
4
0
0
0
10
0
1
0
4
1
0
6
2
.2
6
0
5
2
4
0
0
4
2
2
14
0
0
0
1
10
0
1
0
0
6
6
3
.2
6
0
4
2
5
0
0
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